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Abstract 
This paper provides a comparative perspective on changes in the governance of U.S. 
universities in the past two decades. An analysis of trends revealed in U.S. national surveys 
in 1992 and 2007 shows that faculty influence in decision making has become much 
more l imited to personnel issues, while the influence of academic middle management -
particular department chairs and deans - has expanded, especially in matters of budget 
and establishment of new academic programs, at both the expense of the faculty and even 
the central university administration. These findings are compared to those for twelve 
other developed nations as reflected in a 2007-08 global 19 nation survey: The Changing 
Academic Profession. Such comparisons reveal the greater role of external stakeholders, 
including national governments, in most nations outside the U.S. Recent trends, however, 
suggest that while many national governments outside the U.S are increasing the autonomy 
of universities from government, the federal involvement in higher education in the U.S. is 
increasing amid such growing decentralization in the governance of universities elsewhere. 
The findings are interpreted in terms of the search by national governments globally to 
achieve a "delicate balance" between the demands for autonomy to support academic quality 
and accountability for the large public investment in higher education 
Introduction: The Basic Lay of the Land 
As many nations seek to build "world-class" universities as a strategy for enhancing their 
competitive position in the global "knowledge economy," there has been increasing attention 
to the apparent success of the "American" university as a potential model to emulate. U.S. 
universities, after all, dominate the various world rankings (Wildavsky, 2010); and the notion 
has become widely accepted that one of the key distinguishing features of the U.S. university 
that accounts for this academic success is its distinctive organization and relative autonomy 
from government (Clotfelter,2010). The U.S. system is indeed relatively insulated from central 
or even state government by its corporate form (and the historic dominance of the private 
sector): universities are chartered by state governments and those charters vest ultimate 
legal power in a self-perpetuating board of lay trustees who serve as the ultimate and legal 
arbiters of organizational decisions - academic, financial and otherwise 1. Ultimately, the 
theory is that corporate independence w i l l ensure the unfettered pursuit of distinction in 
a competitive academic market and at the same preserve the public interest insofar as lay 
members provide a counterweight to the faculty's purely academic (and some would argue 
narcissistic) concerns. 
Stated simply, the organization of the American university has pitted a legally supreme 
board of trustees and their designated representative (the President or Chancellor), on the 
one hand (or at the top) against an increasingly assertive faculty, on the other (at the bottom) 
whose major claim to a role in governance is that they bring to the table the highly specialized 
1 This corporate arrangement is similar for public institutions, although membership on their boards of 
trustees are typically appointed by politicians or elected by the public. Indeed, in a few states - Michigan and 
California - the university is granted autonomy in the state Constitution. 
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expertise required to make decisions related to research, academic programs and faculty 
personnel (Clark, 1983). In some sense, the history of governance of U.S. universities is a 
history of the struggle between the faculty and the president or administration (representing 
the board of trustees) to find some accommodations in joint ly steering the enterprise. The 
governance drama in the U.S. case has thus been for the most part an internal one - fought 
with in the boundaries of the campus 2. To be sure, as American higher education expanded in 
the post-World War II period, and vast new public systems of universities were established 
by the individual states, the infusion of resources from al l levels of government re-calibrated 
the " internal" balance on campus as between the faculty and the administration, usually in 
favor of the administration as the primary "boundary spanners' between the campus and the 
political system 3. 
What becomes readily apparent from this description is just how different the U.S. system 
is from most of the rest of the globe. In Continental Europe and in most of Asia (Germany 
and Japan are the prototypes), the faculties at the individual universities dominate those 
universities and governance typically plays out between the individual faculties or even 
individual professors and the Ministry (or other regional entities). Central administrations 
(rectors) are relatively weak and certainly do not offer a competing center of power on the 
campus. 
This is the basic context with in which we want in the remainder of this paper to (1) 
describe two basic trends currently underway in the U.S. in terms of the faculty role in 
university governance and the re-alignment of relationships on campus; and (2) to describe 
the changing nature of federal involvement in higher education which, we believe, has 
some important implications for the vaunted autonomy from government of the American 
university. Finally, (3) we want to consider these changes in l ight of current university reforms 
outside the U.S. as we l l their implications for the future of higher education in Kazakhstan. 
Before proceeding to the basic discussion of current governance trends in the U.S., we 
want to provide a brief overview of the data sources for most of the subsequent discussion: 
the 1992 Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching's International Academic 
Profession survey (Altbach, 1996) and The Changing Academic Profession [CAP] survey of 
2007-08 (Cummings and Finkelstein, 2011). 
Data Sources 
In 1992, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching conducted the first 
international survey of the academic profession. Nearly 20K academic staff in fourteen 
countries responded to an instrument including questions about career and work experience, 
teaching and research activities, perceptions of the higher education system, generally, and 
of organization and governance, in particular (Altbach, 1996). Fifteen years later, a group of 
professors who had played a leading role in the 1992 survey organized a fol low-up conducted 
during 2007-08 wi th a common sampling frame and instrument. More than 20K academic 
staff responded from 19 countries, including ten of the original Carnegie 14, Australia, Brazil, 
Hong Kong (treated here as a separate country prior to its return to China by the British), 
Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, South Korea, the UK, and the US. The reference 
population of both the Carnegie and the CAP Survey primarily comprised fu l l - t ime teaching 
2 Of course with the advent of public systems within the individual states, the proverbial "campus" might 
expand 10-20 fold under single corporate board. 
3 But sometimes in favor of faculty to the extent that they could independently command government 
resources to fund their research and laboratories. 
51 
professionals in higher education institutions that offer a baccalaureate degree or higher 
(Type A of the OECD classification or Level 5A of the ISCED-97). 
The 2007-08 CAP survey included a critical mass of questions related to each of the 
CAP's three major themes: managerialism, internationalization, and relevance. The items on 
managerialism - which included faculty perceptions of the power and influence of various 
external and internal constituencies (including themselves) in campus decision-making, in 
budgeting policies and practices, in the evaluation of teaching and research, and in their 
academic units - largely replicated the items in the original 1992 Carnegie survey- effectively 
permitting a comparison of changing perceptions over a 15 year period - a period which in 
the U.S. saw almost no systematic national study of academic governance. 
Findings: The Shrinking Faculty Role and the Rise of Deans 
The 1992 and 2007 surveys posed a similar set of questions providing respondents wi th a 
series of decision areas (faculty appointments, approving new academic programs, selecting 
top administrators, etc.) and asking them to rate the relative influence of key stakeholders 
in making those decisions. For purposes of simplicity, we focused on five decision categories 
that we believed were representative of the continuum of decisions from purely personnel 
and curricular (the typical domain of the faculty) to budgetary and administrator selection 
(traditionally outside the faculty's purview) and sought to compare the responses in 1992 
to those in 2007 for three stakeholder groups: faculty (including individual faculty, faculty 
committee and senates/unions), middle managers (deans and department chairs) and 
central administration (including boards and external groups). The results are displayed in 
Table 1 below. 
Table 1. Summary: At your institution, which actor has the primary influence on the fol lowing 
decisions? (% very influential & influential) 1992 vs. 2007 
Central Admin 
& External Stakeholders 
Deans & Chairs Internal Faculty Bodies 
1992 2007 1992 2007 1992 2007 
Selecting key administrators 83.7% 76.9% 11.3% 14.7% 4.9% 8.3% 
Choosing new faculty 17.6% 5.6% 19.8% 33.0% 62.5% 61.4% 
Making faculty promotion 
and tenure decisions 
31.9% 18.3% 30.9% 30.5% 37.2% 51.1% 
Determining 
budget priorities 
86.5% 55.4% 9.3% 42.4% 4.2% 2.2% 
Approving 
new academic programs 
47.4% 47.7% 27.6% 16.6% 25.0% 35.6% 
Data source: CAP Kassel International Survey, 2009 
If we examine the results for the two areas of faculty personnel which have traditionally 
fallen with in the purview of the American faculty (choosing new faculty and making faculty 
promotion and tenure decisions), a clear pattern emerges. Between 1992-2007, central 
administration and external groups lost influence in these matters while deans/department 
chairs and faculty gained or retained their influence. According to these data, by 2007, the 
faculty had clearly consolidated its hold over faculty personnel decisions. At the other end 
of the decision spectrum, i.e. establishing budget priorities, a very different trend emerges. 
Central administrators and external groups lost influence between 1992-2007 while middle 
management (deans and department chairs) gained influence. While, central administration 
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was perceived as retaining the major share of influence in budgetary matters (55.4 percent 
of respondents s t i l l saw them as the primary arbiters in matters of budget); it was however 
the deans who relative to the faculty gained influence during this period. In 1992, deans and 
faculty were perceived to be about equally ineffectual in budgetary matters (perceived as 
primary influencers by 4.2 - 9.3 percent of respondents). By 2007, the deans were perceived 
as primary influencers by more than two-fifths (only marginally below central administration). 
In the area of selection of administrators central administration retains its primary influence 
during this period. Neither deans nor faculty appear to have made any inroads in this area. 
The key area of approving new academic programs reveals a different trend. The declining 
influence on the part of deans and department chairs, and steady or increasing influence on 
the part both of central administration and faculty bodies. That administrators continue to 
retain the highest share of influence in new academic program approval suggests the key 
role of resources (budget) in the start-up of new programs. That the faculty have increased 
their influence may be attributable to two forces. The persistence in faculty efforts to exert 
their control over academic program (an area traditionally the domain of the faculty) as we l l 
as the increasing entrepreneurial activity of faculty in the area of new academic program 
development through securing external, grant support. 
In sum, the overall pattern is one of continued ascendance of central administration in 
matters of budget, administrative staffing and new academic programs, the consolidation of 
faculty influence in the area of faculty personnel decisions, and the increasing influence of 
deans and department chairs (middle management), especially in budgetary matters. 
While, by way of counterpoint, administrative influence appears to be increasing, that 
increase may be less at the central administrative level, and more decentralized at the 
Level of the academic unit. That is, the available evidence suggests that deans of academic 
unit (schools or colleges) have been the primary beneficiaries of increased administrative 
influence -species of "decentralized" bureaucratization. 
Historically,faculty's influence in governance has varied by institutional type and academic 
f ield: at the most prestigious, research institutions, faculty have tended to be more influential 
overall (although there are known to be institutional cultures more or less hospitable to 
faculty influence, e.g. faculty at Yale) as have faculty in the natural sciences and in the 
professions, esp. medicine and law. There is some evidence that the decline has been across 
the board. There remains anecdotal evidence that institutional prestige st i l l matters — 
witness the faculty response to the recent trustee firing of the president at the University of 
Virginia and her subsequent re-instatement after faculty protest and resignations. 
How does the situation of U.S. faculty compare to their counterparts in other mature 
economies and nations? Data from the Changing Academic Profession, 2007-08, suggest that 
American faculty are less influential overall than their colleagues in Canada, Germany, Italy, 
Japan and the Scandinavian countries (Finkelstein, 2012). Most notably, these faculties wield 
influence on matters of budget.administrator selection and academic programs unimaginable 
to American faculty. Moreover, they typically wield influence in the public policy process 
through their role on national system governance mechanism such as the University Grants 
Committee in the UK, various national disciplinary committees in France and Germany and 
directly on the staff of national ministries of education (Clark, 1983). 
The U.S. system tends to shield faculty from intrusion by the state, especially in matters of 
curriculum, academic programs and personnel and research. It does so, however, at the price 
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of erecting a much more formidable power center at home - t h e local president who, subject 
to board approval, remains the ultimate source on legally binding institutional decisions. 
Two new developments that w i l l be playing out over the next 5-10 years merit special 
attention - as they potentially affect this portrait we have drawn: 
(1) The trend outside the U.S. to increase the autonomy of individual universities vis-a-
vis the central government - a trend that, harkening to the American model - is premised 
on the notion that institutional autonomy is a key ingredient of academic quality. This 
trend is associated wi th the growth of central administration at the individual university 
level (threatening the tradit ional absence of a local administrative counterpoint to faculty 
influence); 
(2) The trend in the U.S. toward an increasingly intrusive role of the federal government in 
higher education threatening the vaunted autonomy of America's universities. 
Trends in the Reform of Higher Education Governance Outside the U.S. 
Most would agree that the pace of governmental efforts to reform higher education 
systems at the national level has accelerated markedly since the mid-1990s. The thrust of 
many such efforts has been to decentralize academic and personnel decision-making. 
In several countries, there are signs of the growing decentralization of the employment 
and working conditions of academics. There are various shifts of responsibility towards the 
academic workplace according to country: intermediazation as a shift of responsibility from 
the central government to intermediate bodies; regionalization as a shift of responsibility 
from central to regional state authorizes; localization as the shift of responsibility to the 
local level of employer regulations and local collective bargaining; and individualization as 
a shift towards individual bargaining between academics and institutional representatives. 
Salaries, teaching loads and other elements of t ime and resource allocation tend to become 
more flexible and are reorganized according to institutional and individual circumstances 
(Enders,2001). 
This devolution of responsibility downward has usually been accompanied by both 
increased regulation of performance (quality assurance standards and processes) and also by 
the mushrooming of administrative staff at the regional and institutional levels. Some have 
suggested that such efforts to increase institutional autonomy (and, of course, accountability) 
have merely led to "re-bureacratization" - but now at the local level (Enders, 2001). 
While Enders was referring to Europe in his analysis, Japan's National Universities may 
represent the most extreme example of this trend. In 2002, new legislation re-established 
the nation's 99 national universities as quasi-independent entities, governed by autonomous 
boards of trustees (appointed by the Ministry, to be sure). In tandem,the Japanese government 
reduced overall university expenditures, established a performance - funding system for 
designated "centers of excellence" and introduced fixed contract staffing into the universities. 
It is s t i l l too early to t e l l whether what appears to be an "Americanization" plan for Japan's 
elite public sector w i l l indeed be implemented as conceptualized or whether, if implemented 
with f idel i ty, it w i l l have the desired effect - targeting funding on performance, encouraging 
competition and enhancing quality.The same can be said about reform efforts in Europe.The 
point, however, is that governance in many regions of the world are moving toward some 
version of a decentralized American model. To the extent that this is occurring, it does so, 
quite ironically, at a t ime when the decentralized, autonomy protecting "American " model 
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may itself be undergoing something of a silent transformation as the role of the federal 
government in American higher education becomes both stronger and more suffocating. 
Most universities in transition have started to adopt the Western academic model. In the 
case of Kazakhstan, twenty years of national independence have been accompanied wi th 
the challenges of struggling wi th the ideological regimentation and the centralist model 
of higher education governance. Universities have experienced t ight control of the state 
and at the same time have been under pressure to raise standards and internationalize the 
higher education system. There is anecdotal evidence that the state control model of higher 
education governance has gone to such lengths as micro-managing academic processes of 
universities.This has led to over-bureaucratization of the higher education management and 
serious concerns have been raised by university leaders and faculty members. 
After the fa l l of the Soviet Union, national strategic plans have clearly focused on steering 
academic institutions to serve economic interests of the nation. Similar to other transitional 
economies, key trends of higher education governance include decentralization and 
privatization.The marketization of higher education has implied the need for the development 
of institutional self-governance and f lex ib i l i ty With the increasing effect of the market forces, 
the state has started to reformulate its long-standing relationship wi th universities and is 
now considering to devolve greater autonomy to them. It is envisioned that by 2018 the 
whole of higher education institutions w i l l be autonomous. The Ministry of Education and 
Science seems to proceed w i th caution and the process of granting university autonomy 
tends to be gradual. The primary step is to grant institutional autonomy to well-established 
national universities by 2015. At present, in order to enhance institutional autonomy, the 
Ministry has established buffer agencies ensuring public accountability and quality control. 
The national policies of education development have encouraged academic institutions to 
adopt best practices of higher education management originating predominantly in the 
West. These reforms and appropriate legal frameworks of introducing institutional freedom, 
implied by the Bologna Process, establishing the Boards of Trustees and holding merit-based 
selection of candidates for the post of university leaders are under way. 
I t i s tooear lyto state if Kazakhstan's higher education system is readyto adopt organizational 
principles of university autonomy. There is good reason to believe that the granting of 
academic autonomy w i l l facilitate the market relevance of the courses. As the patterns of 
institutional self-governance are very diverse, the reformulation of the relationship between 
the state and universities is likely to lead to evolving different context-sensitive strategies of 
higher education governance. 
The Changing Role of the U.S. Government in Higher Education 
Whether one selects 2002 (debate begins on the re-authorization of the Higher Education 
Act by the U.S. Congress) or 2006 (the Report of the Commission on the Future of American 
Higher Education appointed by Margaret Spellings, U.S. Secretary of Education) as the 
watershed (demarcator), a "new era" is emerging -very rapidly - in the relationship between 
the federal government and institutions of higher education in the U. S. (Eaton, 2012). The 
historically "hands-off" role of central government in the U.S. (beyond providing student aid 
and research funding) is evolving into a substantively regulatory one. 
The new era was precipitated by the confluence of a variety of forces, including the 
escalating costs of university tuit ion in the U.S. threatening the capability of most middle-
class families to afford a college education for their children, a spate of national reports 
questioning the substantive outcomes and economic value of a four-year undergraduate 
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degree, public scandals involving for-profit, private institutions that have paid headhunters to 
recruit new students-many of questionable academic ability - helped them apply for billions 
of dollars of federal student aid loans , only to have them either drop out prior to degree 
or certificate completion or be unable to find jobs and default on their federal loans -and 
a general sense that higher education institutions are not providing adequate information 
for consumers of their "high priced" services. There was enormous political pressure for the 
federal government to step in and ensure the provision of adequate information to consumers 
as we l l as protect federal student aid investments. This resulted in the passage of federal 
legislation in the 1990s (for the first time) and a spate of new rules subsequently aimed at 
regulating the standards and process of institutional accreditation or quality assurance. 
By way of background, a word about quality assurance in the U.S. context. Historically, 
quality assurance in higher education in the U.S. operated on the principles of voluntary 
self-regulation, peer review and a focus on improvement. In each of seven geographic 
regions, voluntary organizations arose of universities and secondary schools (e.g. the Middle 
States Association of Schools and Colleges in the mid-Atlantic area). These associations 
collaboratively developed broad, albeit flexible, standards for assessing quality and 
organized a system whereby universities undertook periodic self-studies that addressed 
regional standards, and were "visited" by teams of reviewers from peer institutions to assess 
the extent to which standards were being met. Visiting teams developed recommendations 
for improvement and for the award of overall accreditation status. It is this voluntary system 
of self-regulation supplemented by a similar discipline-specific process undertaken under 
the aegis of various national disciplinary and professional associations that have shielded 
colleges and universities in the U.S.from national government mandates related to academic 
programs, student admissions, staffing levels and qualifications, etc. Indeed, for the past 
50 years, the U.S. government has put its own imprimatur on the work of these "voluntary" 
regional and professional accrediting associations by"accepting"their judgments as the basis 
of el igibi l ity of enrolled students for federal financial aid. No more. New federal legislation 
and rules mandate uniform standards that must be met by a l l institutions as we l l as uniform 
indicators of such standards.Thus, it is no longer sufficient to have a local plan for assessing 
student outcomes, but rather a uniform set of quantitative indicators—across a l l institutions. 
Moreover, the new rules specify the processes to be used in quality assurance, including who 
may serve on review committees. Staff at the U.S. Department of Education review reports 
and are increasingly questioning specific decisions or recommendations by peer review 
teams (Eaton, 2012). Control is enforced through the threat of removal of an institution from 
the accreditation list or of an individual from the accreditation team roster. What is emerging 
is a standardized, bureaucratic compliance-oriented process that imposes uniformity in both 
substantive standards and quality assurance processes as we l l as centralized, bureaucratic 
supervision of the process. While the public policy intent of such changes are laudably aimed 
at "consumer protection" and optimizing the quality and transparency of information about 
institutions of higher education (all public goods), they may also have quite unintended and 
negative consequences for the historic autonomy of universities in the U.S. as we l l as the 
principle of the supremacy of peer review in deliberations about academic quality. 
What Do These New Developments in University Governance Mean? 
It is s t i l l too early to make judgments aboutthe impact of decentralization and the expansion 
of university autonomy in Europe and Japan, as it is about the increasing centralization and 
chipping away at institutional autonomy in the U.S. It seems unlikely that national Ministries 
are losing their place at the center of most national systems in Europe and Asia; nor that the 
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federal government in the U.S. w i l l take on the trappings of a tradit ional national Ministry 
of Education. 
For universities in transition, including higher education institutions of Kazakhstan, 
there are good lessons to learn. As the state carefully examines international practices 
of higher education governance, universities need to prove that they have developed 
adequate accountability measures. Institutional autonomy is highly likely to be granted to 
those academic institutions that w i l l manage to provide effective internal accountability 
mechanisms and perform institutional credibility and strategic leadership. There seems to 
be an agreement at both ends of the government and most public universities that the state 
w i l l continue to play a substantive role in the higher education governance. 
What these developments demonstrate is that higher education systems across the 
globe are experiencing seismic pressures at once to promote academic quality and scientific 
innovation among their university systems to ensure their economic competitiveness in 
the global economy at the same time that they are seeking to "manage" the demands of 
massification and protect their public investment in colleges and universities. 
These pressures are initially disrupting the balance between government action and 
university autonomy and we are in the midst of a period of "re-calibration" - even in the 
U.S. system. We al l need to be watching these developments carefully and constantly re-
appraising the "delicate balance" between universities and the public interest. 
References 
Altbach, P. G. (Ed.). (1996). The International Academic Profession: Portraits of Fourteen 
Countries. Princeton, NhCarnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. 
Clotfelter, C. (2010). American Universities in the Global Market. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Cummings, W. & Finkelstein, M. (2011). Scholars in the Changing American Academy: New 
Contexts, New Rules, and New Roles. Dordrecht, NL: Springer. 
Eaton, J. (2012). "The Future of Accreditation." Planning for Higher Education 40 (April-June). 
EndersJ. (2001). Academic Staff in Europe: Changing Contexts and Conditions. Westport,CT: 
Greenwood Press. 
Finkelstein, M. (2012) "American Faculty and their Institutions: The Global View." Change 44 
(May/June). 48-59. 
Finkelstein, M., M.Ju and W. Cummings (2011). "The United States of America: Perspectives 
on Faculty Governance, 1992-2007." In: Locke, W, W Cummings and D. Fisher. Dordrecht, NL: 
Springer. 
Kaplan, G.,E. (2002). Preliminary Results from the 2001 Surveyon HigherEducation Governance. 
Washington, D.C.: AmericanAssociation of University Professors. 
Tierney, WG. & MinorJ.T. (2003). Challenges for Governance: A National Report. Los Angeles: 
Center for Higher Education Policy Analysis, University of Southern California. 
Wildavsky, B. (2010). The Great Brain Race. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
